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Istvan Nyari
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ABSTRACT
The red mud reservoir failure in Ajka, Hungary has claimed 10 lives and cost millions of dollars in damages. Immediately after
emergency measures investigations started to shed light on causes and circumstances. The authors performed an extensive desktop
study of about 20 thousand pages reaching back to the 1970s, when the facility has been designed.
Beside this study the dam and its area have gone through series of site investigations, from drilling to CPTu testing and laboratory
testing. The information so collected resulted in the following conclusion.
Contributing factors to this substantial dam failure included poor siting of the facility, partly on top of a diverted creek bed and marshy
area; design faults when calculating safety reserves, as well as basic stability at designed maximum reservoir load. Construction
technology has not been controlled; its foundation was built unprofessionally. The negligence of regulators at licensing, at
commissioning, as well as at the periodic safety reviews. There was no geotechnical monitoring plan, it was considered to be
unnecessary. External negative factors further converged with these deficiencies. The frequency of smaller earthquakes was
significantly higher in the accident-preceding year than during the previous ten years. Precipitation was unusual, its level during the
accident-preceding half year reached an incidence frequency of 3000 years! Heightened groundwater level saturated the clay base
surface of the reservoir already weakened by cat-ion exchanges due to high alkalinity of red mud – on sloping surface. The slurry
walls built around the reservoir, from environmental protection purpose, have intensified this process. Strong wind gusts shifting
direction pressured the dam walls during the day of accident.
INTRODUCTION
On October 4th, 2010, at 12:14, near Kolontár, Hungary, the
worst industrial accident happened in the country’s history.
The north-western corner of the No. 10 red mud reservoir,
operated by the Hungarian Aluminium Production and
Trading Company (MAL Zrt), broke, with tragic
consequences.
As a result of the dam rapture, hundreds of thousand cubic
meters highly alkaline (around 13 pH) red mud and
technological water flooded the surroundings: various parts of
the municipalities of Kolontár, Devecser, and Somlóvásárhely
along the Torna creek valley (see Figure 1.). The catastrophe
resulted in 10 casualties, while 286 persons had to be treated
by medical personnel, damaged 367 properties, and covered
1017 hectares land.
Based on existing information, there was no sing of the rapture
before the even occurred. There was no premonitory requiring
action (e.g. seepage of red mud, cracks in the dam structure,
scaling slope) noticed during the daily and other regular expert
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walkouts and other checks, therefore the event occurred
unexpectedly.

Fig. 1. satellite image of the flooded are by NASA October 9,
2010
It is also important to note that never during the operation of
reservoir No. 10 its designed and permitted maximum storage
level of red mud and water has been exceeded.
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Data used for analyses
The management of MAL zrt has contracted our company to
study all available documentation relevant to this event, going
back to three decades (approximately consisting of 20
thousand pages) and all the information collected after the
accident by various experts and institutes, via geotechnical
investigations (117 boreholes and CPTu with the total length
of 2006 m), and processing of laboratory test results. This
manuscript is based on all these information.

Reservoirs VI-VIII have got recultivated already, while this
process is still on at reservoir IX. On the recultivated surface
of reservoir VIII, MAL Zrt plans to deposit more red mud
resulted from dry technology processing. Figure 3. shows the
layout of red mud reservoirs VI-X/A.

Short history of MAL Zrt
Through the privatisation process along the socio-economic
changes in Central and East Europe, the privy of the
Hungarian Aluminium Trust, the National Privatization and
Trustee Co. and its 100% owned Hungalu Co. has privatized
the Ajka Aluminium Industry Ltd, which was, in those times,
one of the frontrunners in Hungarian alum earth (aluminium
oxide) production. Since the privatization the company has
got transformed a number of times until it became MAL Zrt,
establish in 1995 by private investors.
Utilizing the vast amount of economically producible bauxite
the company has grown to become one of the biggest
industrial complexes, employing 6000 workers. 70-75% od
the company’s products are sold for West European export.

0,8 - 1,5 km to the north of the reservoirs Kolontár and 2,5 3,0 km to the southeast Padragkút municipalities can be found.
Torna creek is situated on the south side of the reservoirs, into
which Csinger creek flows. The original, natural path of
Torna creek has run on the north side of the reservoirs.
The entire industrial site of MAL Zrt is over 250 hectares (ha),
of which 62 ha is factory and 174 ha is red mud reservoir. The
damaged Reservoir X. is over 19 ha, with 18-25,68 m dam
height.

OUTLINE OF THE SITE

HISTORY OF RESERVOIR X

The Ajka Alum Earth Factory has got built in 1942-1943,
based on the bauxite and coal deposits found in the area. The
facility is situated in Veszprém County, Hungary, in the southwest suburb of Ajka municipality, next to the BudapestSzombathely railway corridor. There is railway line north of
the factory, and behind it stands the slag and ash repository of
the Bakony Power Plant, plus some houses. To the east there
is the power plant, to the south there are agricultural lands and
to the west there are the red mud reservoirs of the MAL Zrt
(see Figure 2).

In Hungary aluminium oxide production is based on the Bauer
technology, resulting in up till now non-reusable high volume,
highly alkaline red mud „waste”. Its volume is twice as large
as the aluminium oxide produced, therefor required huge
landfill sites. This red mud has special physical properties,
similar to clay, binding caustic soda, iron and water. Along
geotechnical soil characterization (particle distribution for
grainy, plasticity index for more bind soils) it can be
considered for both grainy (mud or powdery sand) and bind
(clay). Its water content remains relatively stabile for a long
time, so in the deeper layers even years later it is between 30
to 40 per cent. The top layer, after extended dry period, starts
to heavily crack.
Production capacity has been increased in the 1970s. During
those times reservoir VIII has been filled up till 1981. After
that reservoir IX has got operated till 2000. Still during its
operation as a government organization the company has got
the design study for its red mud deposition prepared by a
design firm (designer) in 1980.
All together ten sites have been considered (from „A” to „J”),
from which site „I” has been assigned, as the result of a
tedious regulatory process, to establish future reservoir X.
This siting process was disputed from the 1980s amongst the
political leaders of those times, the company and the
communities of the surroundings (1). The interests of local
people have got ignored, superseded by economic and political
interests. The company has been one of the major economic

Fig 2. MAL Zrt. and its surroundings (Google)
There has been 11 red mud reservoirs (I—X and X/A) built up
till now on this industrial site of which I-V are situated inside
Ajka, in the factory site, while reservoirs VI-X/A lay between
Ajka and Kolontár on the right side the the road to Kolontár.
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Fig. 3. Layout of the reservoirs
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players in the country. Therefore the selection process of its
waste site has been based mostly of its perceived economic
and technical benefits in the communist state. Considerations
of potential human casualties in an industrial accident have not
been high on the list of decision-makers.
The groundwater pollution resulting from reservoirs VI-IX has
become known during those times, as the reservoirs have not
got sealed. The regulator ordered to stop further pollution, so
the company has contracted designer to prepare a study for
suitable intervention. Based on due engineering geological
investigations, limiting further pollution effectively and
economically required underground corrective measures.
Having considered 8 different alternative measures the choice
was to erect diaphragm walls around reservoirs VI-X.
After commissioning reservoir IX the pollution became so
severe that it has started to endanger the local drinking water
base. Various interventions have been made:
• Diaphragm walls for vertical seal
• Water level observation wells
• Trench system inside the diaphragm walls
• Trench system outside the diaphragm walls
Elements of the environmental protection system:
(a) Vertical closures (diaphragm wall)
(b) Collection system for polluted waters
(c) Collection system for clean water
(d) Monitoring systems
(a) Vertical closures
Retaining walls have been constructed in a number of phases,
in all together 7.400 m length, between 1987 and 2001, and
the walls were totally closed the reservoir area.
(b) Collection system for polluted waters:
• Trenches (leachate trenches)
• Collection basins
(c) Collection system for clean water:
• Tósoki basin
• Northern seepage system
(d) Monitoring systems:
• Observation wells
• Dug wells
• Surface sampling points
• Leachate sampling points
• Waste sinking level measurement points
Parallel to the environmental protection retaining walls, was
the design of reservoir X. In its theoretical licensing plan
(April 1984) the height of the continuously hydraulically
constructed dams, from the slag and ash of the local power
plant, would have reached 41,5 - 43,5 m with 1:1 slope
incline. Thus the maximum height of the 10 m wide dam crest
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would reach 235,5 m.a.s.l (meter above the Baltic sea). The
maximum allowed level for red mud fill would have been
234,5 m.a.s.l, resulting in 13M m3 red mud storage capacity.
The close to flat terrain slanted towards the west. The average
slant in the valley was 5-8 per cent. The highest point at the
nothestern corner was about 197,5 m.a.s.l and the lowest at the
western wall was 191,0 m.a.s.l.
Dam construction was planned in two phases:
Phase I: to level 216,00 m.a.s.l (with level 215,0 m.a.s.l red
mud fill),
Phase II: to level 235,50 m.a.s.l (with level 234, 5 m.a.s.l red
mud fill).
Later, fortunately, these planned heights have been rejected,
and in the Detailed geotechnical expert report of January 1990
„only” 216,50 m.a.s.l dam crown height has been noted,
meaning a maximum of 25 m dam height, with 1:1 slope
incline on the northern and southern walls and 1:2 slope
incline on the external side of the western wall.
First licencing for constructing reservoir X was awarded in
1993, which was started in the same year with the technology
used at reservoir IX. Phese I was concluded in 1995 reaching
205,00 m.a.s.l dam crown level with 1:1 slope incline. The
slag and ash tailing conductor has been built, as well as
slanted water sinks on both the eastern and southern sides.
Then phase II was started buildin up the dam to level 216,5
m.a.s.l, and widening the western walls due to recultivation
prescriptions with 1:2 slope incline and a 5 m wide berm. The
bottom width of the so built dam system varied between 50
and 80 m, depending on terrain conditions. The designed
height of the dams varied between 21 and 25 m. The are of
the reservoir is approximately 19 ha, its final capacity at
216,00 m.a.s.l filling level was circa 4,2-4,5M m3.
The lengths of reservoir X are 657 m on north, 581 m on west,
269 m on south, and 405 m on east.
In 1998 the filling of reservoir X has started. Red mud, diluted
with process water in 1:5 ratio has been transported to the
reservoir via pipe system from the factory site. The red mud
has been blown circularly to the inner slopes of the reservoir
for slushing the surface. This increases water retaining
properties. Ideally the water depth increases from the edges to
the centre inside the reservoir. Till the end of 2009 3.405.000
m3 materia has got deposited.
As the factory has used up all its reservoir capacities during
years of operation, it had no space for further expansion,
except to increase the dam crown to an even height across the
existing reservoir walls. The construction of reservoir X has
started with the power plant ash fill up through a pipe between
two smaller dams. The so created dam crown has not been on
even level. The northern side has been lower from the start of
construction. As the red mud level increased this uneven hight
became prevalent. Therefore the hightening of the norhtern
wall became necessary in order to use the maximum designed
and licenced capacity of the reservoir. This work has been
completed in July 2010 with the use of materials from nearby
ash storage. The once deposited and since cemented ash was
broken by bulldozer clam-shell and put on top of the dam’s
nortehrn wall. The broken cemented ash parts have been
broken into smaller particles by the dozer blade, smoothened,
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and then compressed by roller. This method produced 0.250.30 m even layers. To increase compression efficiency, water
has been sprinkled on the layers. This way a relatively even
and homogenious crown has been formed. These have been
performed in approximately 400 m length on the northern
wall. The sodden and humusy parts have been removed and
corrected. The entire work has been completed in about two
weeks, using 5277 m3 materials. The added layers’ thickness
varied between 0.3 and 1.4 m.
The red mud reservoir, the condition of the dams have been
monitored by eye daily. The dams vave been driven around
by 4 x 4, looking for signs of wetting. On each Mondays the
level of liquid in the reservoir has been measured by the pump
operators and data recorded. There was never any sign
recorded of a problem. The appropriate flushing of red mud,
and the condition of the pipe system has been checked upon
twice daily.
According to the records, on October 4th, 2010, at the time of
the dam rapture, the level of tailings in the reservoir was at
215,88 m.a.s.l, thus 0.12 m lower than its maxmum allowed
level of 216,00 m.a.s.l. The catastrophy occurred at 12:10
according to the work logbook, and caused complete
electricity failure.
CONSTRUCTION OF RESERVOIR X
According to design, at the bottom of the dams, on both sides,
an earthwork of 1,0 - 1,5 - 1,8 m height, 2,5 – 4,0 m crown
width, and 1:1 and 1:1.5 m slope inclines had to be built. This
was necessary because the stabilization of slag-ash structure
required some days and ill that these earth structures supported
the tailing. These earthworks have been prepared by dozer
extracting and building up materials to the its left and right
and thus taking off top soils to about 1 m depth. The
technology of this embankment construction is shown on
Figure 4.

Fig. 4. Dam building technology
The Ø350 mud circular pipe was laid on the external dam side.
According to the timing, the filling pipes branch off upward
by extension. The dams were built of the slag-ash mud by
hydromechanization.
Upon the phase I. (phase between the earth dams) on the two
brims of the dam by the use of a bulldozer, the dams of the
next phases were constructed of its own material. In the same
way were built the dams of the dam’s own material also in
transversal direction, as sealing of the construction joints. As a
consequence of the dam’s inclined surface, the superfluous
water flew on the embankment into the provisional mud
reservoir, at the sole of the western dam. Along the dam’s
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longitudinal side the heaped embankment material was loose.
In the course of the construction the voids of this embankment
were filled up with diluted mud. The outer, loose parts
dropped down to the sole of the dam, or had been eroded
during the years. When building the embankment,
construction of a seepage collecting ditch system became also
necessary, for collecting and returning the effluent water,
which left the area and to introduce it into the secondary
settling tank.
Construction of the north dam started at its eastern end and
proceeded toward the western dam. Before the pumping
station, on the deepest point of the area, a reservoir was to be
built for the returning mud water. It was pumped back with a
pump into the factory. On the east dam of about 4 places took
place, where the cross section changed. In the vicinity of the
injection points the bigger grains of the mud, the slag settled
down, the diluted ash material flew away, therefore the
material of the dam is not of the same quality and homogenous
at every place.
The thickness of the dam’s cross section is not equal because
near to the filling openings the mud, ejected at high pressure,
spread out wider and extruded also laterally. At the meeting
point of the dams IX. and X. started the construction of the
dam on the circular pipe, therefore the highest pressure on the
northern side was the highest. Consequently the northern dam
is “undulating”.
Depending from the weather, the settled slag-ash coagulates in
a favourable dam material, its water permeability, by using a
correct storage technology, practically ceases.
When planning the eastern dam of the reservoir X. it was
taken in consideration, that in the “immediate future” the
construction of the next red mud reservoir is to be expected,
therefore the north dam was built as an intermediate dam. In
this sense its slope was 1 : 1 and the west dam, as the end
toward village Kolontár, was built with a slope of 1 : 2. The
motive of the omission of this extension, could not be
deducted from the disposed documents.
Into the reservoir X. during the construction, the red mud was
already introduced. After this, the construction of the dam
continued until the end of 2001. Due to alignment of the north
dam’s crest, every dam of the reservoir X. reached the
permitted level of 216,50 m.a.s.l.
DESCRIPTION OF THE DAM RAPTURE
In the area of the reservoir from the morning of 4th October
2010 a continuously increasing wind was blowing from
southeast toward northwest. According to the testimonies, the
water of the reservoir rippled, undulated, but did not hit the
walls of the dam. According to the direction of wind, the
waves travelled toward the corner, which broke later away.
In the 6-month period before the wall failure, excessive
volume of precipitation fell in this area. This heightened the
ground water level and a significant amount of rainwater got
in the area within the curtain walls. Consequently the water
balance of the reservoir X. toppled in an unfavourable way.
The water level, what became swollen by the curtain wall, and
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the exceptional volume of the rainwater and seepage water,
collecting in the seepage ditches were pumped regularly into
the reservoir X. Such a big water quantity could not be used
by the technology, therefore it was accumulated in the
reservoir. During the big August rains the water had to be
pumped from the reservoir X. into the neighbouring southward
reservoir X/A.
It could be achieved so, that in the reservoir X. the storage
level does not reach before time the permitted storage level
(216,0 m.a.s.l). This was a technological and economical step,
because it could be reached so, that beside the maintaining the
continuous operation the permitted storage levels do not
exceed in the active reservoirs the permitted storage levels.
The height of the water head above the red mud was due to a
sonar measurement, carried out in a boat at 30th September
2010 was 0,4 - 0,6 m near to the place of the wall failure (it
was necessary for preventing the dust due to the employed
technology and with regard to the natural water evaporation).
At the down of the catastrophe the pumps regulating the
seepage water were in operation, because the volume of the
seepage water increased. However in the days before the
catastrophe it did not rained, but due to the big precipitation
which fell on the by the curtain walls enclosed area of 274
hectares (of which the total area of the reservoirs is 174 ha)
and as consequence of the precipitation at this time the
seepage water seeped through the reservoirs in the
underground and filtered into the “reservoir” encircled by the
curtain walls and indirectly also into the seepage ditches.
No groundwater seepage, no jets, no water eruption (i.e. on the
ground level) were observed neither in the vicinity of the soles
of the dams, nor on higher places, like on the dams.
The catastrophe occurred on a level, being 0.12 m deeper than
the storage level, on 215,88 m.a.s.l. This is proved by the
operational log of the reservoir, what was kept due to the
prescriptions by the factory. The last entry into the diary was
written at about 8 hour at Monday: the water level on the
“water absorbing pipe” is 215,88 m.a.s.l.
Owing to the site diaries, from 13th September 2010 to 4th
October the mud injector on the southern side operated.
During the wall failure the injector Nr. 2. operated on the
same, southern side. Prior to this, from 24 August until 12
September injection took place on the north side.
When the dam breach before the area of the X. reservoir’s
north side sole, and on the area at on the lower transport road
at about 12 hour, the water “billowed”. Workers of the Sédex
Kft., who were working beside the northwest corner of the
reservoir IX., noticed, that on the shrubby area before the
northern dam of the reservoir X. the water is streaming and the
“straw bales are floating on the liquid’s top”
Two eye witnesses, who stayed in the vicinity, narrated, that
beside the north-western corner of the reservoir X. – where the
dam was the highest – in the arched section, and on its
northern wall, a sparkling pink liquid began to flow out and
down through a crack which arose on the upper part of the
dam crest (due to one of the eye-witnesses through a “washed
out groove”) “which was still not dense”. The developing
nearly vertical upper crack, a groove subsequent to this,
extended downward to the sole. Workers, who worked beside
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the reservoir IX., heard a cascade-like voice. The out-flowing
mud inundated quickly the area near to the corner. The mud
flowed out at first only through the crack (“through the
groove”) and dripped down. The high velocity effluent
disrupted the dam material already cracked due to the loads
and 5—6 minutes after the discharge, the dam, containing
rigid, and stiff material suddenly burst, accompanied by a
strong hubbub. One of the huge ash blocks, flying out in
northern direction hit and broke the pole of he electricity wires
in the near. The wires sparked and later got torn. The effluent
mud broke to huge pieces and swept away the dam materials,
sweeping it onto the arable land. After the flowing out the
water level began to sink in the reservoir, therefore it is not
probable, that the liquid “several minutes long” would sweep
over the dam, as one of the eyewitnesses believed. As we
mentioned before, the bigger chunks of the (ash) dam material
flew more toward north and the most part of the liquid flew
also in this direction.
Due to the data so far, the dam breach occurred at 12 hour 14
min. According the eyewitnesses the “red liquid” reached
Kolontár within about 10 minutes.
The northern dam section broke to pieces, beginning from the
western corner at a length of about 300 m. In the mid of this
section the outer slope “broke out”, the dam got punctured and
the red mud flew out through this opening.
Workers, along the northern section of the junction of the
reservoirs IX. and X. heard a “hubbub” and the “dam
trembled” One of the workers, as he said, heard a thump, then
a strong “explosion”, and saw at a distance that the red mud is
flowing. When the dam corner collapsed, at first a 20 – 25 m
wide ”V” shaped gap was formed above (and significantly
water flew out here), then it grew continuously, got deeper and
more red mud flew out through it together with the water. The
flowing out became increasingly louder. After some minutes
the proximal section of the dam “collapsed” and the muddy
water flew out of the reservoir beside a strong turbulence. Due
to one eyewitness at “12 hour 12 minute a 40 m wide rupture
was visible” and later a further, about 10 m wide section
disconnected and fell into the mud. Finally the entire, 60 m
wide dam section broke to pieces. During 15 – 20 minutes
flew out the red mud from the reservoir and at 12 hours 30
minutes almost no water was left in the reservoir. The
“substantial” material flow blow over in a time of 25 – 30
minutes – according to the eyewitnesses. The water drained
nearly completely from the reservoir. The remained stumps of
the western dam wall displayed a breaking surface, which was
perpendicular to the western axe of the dam, its upper third
tilted slightly toward the breach. The surface of the northern
dam’s broken stump had a curious, “L”-shaped breaking
picture, it was nearly vertical.
Upon the mud flow, the internal part of the northern dam’s
damaged section settled. Characteristic, mainly with the dam
axe parallel cracks were formed. The dam crest level tilted
inward, beside the outer dam sole longitudinal and diagonal
cracks were formed, hinting of the dam’s heave.
The state of the section, remained after the breach of the
northern dam’s western section deteriorated continuously. The
cracks of the dam widened, the movements along the nearly
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vertical cracks increased, the significant crack at the junction
of the moving and of the not moving northern dam section
increased, along the outer side repeated ash blocks peeled.
GEOTECHNICS
In April, 1981, 128 borings were carried out as part of the Soil
Mechanical Data Supply presented by the designer. The final
design plans of the reservoir X were based on these
explorations among others. Average depths of the borings
were between 5-7 m.
As the next design phase, the designer composed an expert
opinion on preventing the soil-pollution spread caused by the
reservoir. Additional 25 borings were carried out with an
average depth of 6-8 m, also used at the design of reservoir X.
The Data Supply does not contain the coordinates of the
explorations therefore the accurate positions are unknown.
Laboratory test reports are also missing. Soil mechanical
properties can only be gathered from borehole logs.
The area of the total reservoir is approximately 150 ha
emerging from the valley between Ajka and Kolontár, 10-22
metres above these villages. The following general description
is based on the explorations: the site is covered by an
anthropogenic fill, which is 1-2 m thick and has varying
horizontal and vertical extent. The fill’s state and strength
parameters differ excessively. Mostly, it contains gravelly
sand and clay. Typical surface layer is the organic, silty fine
sand, sandy silt from Holocene epoch. It is thicker (4-6 m) on
the eastern side and gets thinner (0.5-3 m) around reservoir X
on the western side. The young surface layer is followed by
coarse grained measure from Quaternary Period. It consists of
finer grains close to the surface (sandy gravel) and gets coarse
with depth even containing boulder sized (0.1-0.15 m)
particles. The bedrock of the area is the so-called Pannonian
clay. This high-plasticity clay was formed during the filling of
the Pannonian Sea in the Carpathian Basin. The clay’s
thickness goes from hundreds of metres as far as few
kilometres. The dam walls were designed and built from the
by-product of the power plant: slag and ash. This material has
considerable hydraulic binding power and has the grain size
distribution of a silty fine sand. If deposited it becomes hard
and obtains medium permeability. The designer considered the
slag and ash homogeneous with an average strength of 453
kN/m2 after 28 days. Referring to previous tests, the angle of
friction was considered constant 40°, the value of cohesion
was derived from unconfined compression tests.
FUGRO Consult Ltd. carried out 7 borings with continuous
core sampling near the failure with 10 CPTu soundings after
the catastrophe (see Figure 5.). Our aim was to obtain
trustworthy information on the strength parameters of the
subsoil around the failure and particularly of the deposited red
mud.
According top our site investigations and surveying datas
under the critical NW dam corner the ground surface and also
the pannonian clay surface gradient is much bigger than any
other part of the area (see Figure 6.)
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Although red mud cannot be considered as soil it is necessary
to determine soil mechanical parameters in order to perform a
stability analyses.
Previous laboratory tests show high standard deviation.
Friction ratio varies between 0.4-17.0° and cohesion varies
between 1.5-22.2 kPa, which were depends on the water
content of the red mud.
Since red mud is a highly alkaline material reacting, for
instance, with aluminium, therefore it was not heavily used in
valuable laboratory equipment, so only a few such tests could
be performed.

Fig. 5. Site investigations after the catastrophe

Fig. 6. Gradient of the surface level by the NW dam corner
The triaxial tests carried out after the catastrophe defined the
shear strength parameters as φ=2.13°; c=14.8 kPa.
Nevertheless, it is essential to mention that red mud is highly
sensitive to changes in moisture content.
To verify the friction ratio of red mud we also used the
hydrometric measures performed in the reservoir. Based on
the measures the angle of spread was around 1.2-2.8°, which
correlated well with the triaxial test results.
Defining the strength parameters of the dam was also vital and
was absolutely unknown before. Our site surveys showed that
dams built with the hydro-mechanization technology and are
utterly inhomogeneous, and thus the structure became
stratified. The layers can be observed on Figure 7.
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Fig. 7. Dam section by the rapture
To determine the dam’s strength properties we performed the
so called Schmidt hammer tests (widely used for testing
structural strength of concrete structures), an in-situ nondestructive test. The correlation between the dam’s strength
properties and the measured Schmidt rebound numbers has
been established according to EN 13791:2007 referring to
concrete structures. The applied relation, and the matching
strength parameters and rebound numbers of the tested dam
elements is shown on Figure 8, where the red dots are the
calibration values, and the blue dots are the measured values
of the dam.

Fig. 9. Completely soft dam part
Laboratory tests have also been performed, complementing
the in-situ measurements. It was possible to obtain solid
blocks of slag and ash from the failure surroundings. The
following conclusions were made based on the performed
unconfined compression tests. The samples gained from the
borings were loaded perpendicular to the stratigraphy. After
the first cracks the sample could not bear more load and brittle
fracture happened, as shown in Figure 10.
Samples of the blocks were also loaded parallel to the
stratigraphy. After the first vertical cracks appeared the
samples could still bear load (see Figure 11). Failure only
occurred after the fracture of the strongest plate or layer,
usually with brittle fracture.

Fig. 8. Strength of the dam
There is a wide range of differences in the strength parameters
of the intact northern dam wall (б=200-3500 kPa). Based on
the measurements and results the average strength of the
collapsed western wall was no more than б=200-600 kPa.
Figure 9. demonstrates the sensitivity to moisture content
change in the dam. The core of the boring near the failure
contains slag and ash losing its strength due to alkaline water,
and thus becoming soft and degrading.
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Fig. 10. Cracked dam sample
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Fig. 13. Strain values of the clay and the dam

Fig. 11. Unconfined compression test
Based on the in situ and laboratory tests the slag and ash dam
proved to be a rigid structure due to hydro-mechanization.
Small deformations are followed by an abrupt brittle failure
without any warning sign.
It became vital to find relationship between the strength and
deformation parameters of the dam and the clay deposit laying
and supporting underneath. Figure 12. shows connection
between the strength and moisture content of the clay subsoil,
pointing out how strength reduces while moisture content
rises, regardless of the plasticity. The average values of the
tests are б=213 kPa; w=30%. On a sample from the 80 cm
thick layer of clay under the failure, these parameters are
б=174.6 kPa; w=54% (see red dots on Fig. 12.), meaning the
strength of the soaked clay is significantly lower.

Fig. 12. Strength properties of the clay
It is essential to be familiar with the deformations in order to
understand the brittle fracture mechanism. Figure 13. shows
the unconfined compression test results both on slag and clay
samples. While the dam’s strength ends around ε=1-4% by an
abrupt brittle fracture, clays’ strength ceases after a slow
creeping phenomenon after ε=10-25% vertical deformation.
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On the grounds of our tests, measurements and in-situ
observations, the probable boundaries of the dam strength can
be defined as follows.
From the crest near the flooded (inner) part to the toe of dam
on the protected (external) part the dam’s strength varies
between 1000-3000 kPa. This consists of approximately onethird of the dam’s section, and is likely to be mainly
unsaturated (see on Figure 14. Zone 1). The strength of the
remaining two-third part is around 100-500 kPa. From the
crest to level 202.0 mBf the strength of the saturated part is
around 300-500 kPa (Zone 2.), and underneath that level, until
the bottom, it is even lower, at around 0-500 kPa (Zone 3.). It
is understood that these estimated strength values do not have
a uniform distribution, but appear highly varying throughout
the dam structure. Since the dam structure is highly
inhomogeneous, the strength values differ by at least 1 but
rather 2 orders of magnitude.

Fig. 14. Strength distribution in the dam
GROUNDWATER DATA
The area is situated in the valley of Torna creek with Csinger
creek and Padragi stream running into it. Groundwater flows
west from northest in the valley that tends to east - west. The
bases of the creeks’ erosion are Torna talus and Torna bed
cited on the deepest zones of the area resulting in an eastern
flow direction.
Regime of the area is highly affected by precipitation, its
infiltration and the surface water’s flow towards the deepest
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point, thus by the water of Torna.
The creek was diverted from its original path in 1990 to south
of the reservoirs, parallel with the relocated railway line. It
reaches the area from northeast and flows towards Kolontár.
Figure 15. shows the groundwater flow directions of the area
based on 2010’s first half-year data.

Wind
Average wind speed and maximum wind gusts were registered
on the day of the catastrophe. In the 4th of October after a
calm night the wind started to blow and the wind force
reached its maximum exactly when the dam wall collapsed.
At that time the average of the wind speed was 28,8 km/h,
while the maximum wind gust was 48,3 km/h. The wind was
blowing towards the north-western dam corner.
Seismicity

Fig. 15. Groundwater flow direction

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
Rainwater

Ajka lies on an area of Hungary considered seismically calm.
The nearest area, which has been active before, is in 45-50 km
distance, called Berhida, or further areas of Bérbaltavár and
Várpalota. Notably, low activity has been registered in this
area during the observed period of January 1, 2000 and
October 4, 2010 at Pápa, Csót, and Pápasalamon.
Locations of the activities within 50 km diameter of the area
(47° 05' 20.19" N; 17° 29' 43.76" E) can be seen on Figure 17.
in the above mentioned time period.

According to standards the precipitation of the area sealed by
the diaphragm wall must have been collected and lifted up to
the surface of reservoir X. Therefore it is crucial to know the
exact amount of precipitation. A precipitation measurement
station, called Ajka 135, monitored this. After January 1,
2006, the precipitation was registered by the factory’s
measurement station. Based on the data collected, the total
amount’s annual average between 1965 and 2009 was 714mm,
the maximum was 958 mm (2007) and the minimum was 495
mm (2000). The data collected by the Hungarian Central
Institute of Meteorology (OMSZ) between October 1997 and
October 2010 are shown on Figure 16., broken down by 6
month long periods.

Fig. 17. Earthquakes in the region
The Hungarian earthquake observation system has registered
115 earthquakes in the first 8 months of 2010, 72 of them
within 100 km of the dam's area. A map of these locations is
shown on Figure 18. The lowest magnitude was ML=0.5,
while the highest was ML=2.7 (ML: local Richter magnitude).
Most of them were micro quakes centred in the area of Móri
Trench.

Fig. 16. Distribution of rainwater in 6 months periods
It is clear that before the catastrophe the precipitation was
higher than the annual average for years retrospectively.
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concentration began to increase afterwards, up to 100 per cent.
The bottom of the reservoirs were not lined thus the NaOH
could continuously dissolve from the red mud.

Fig. 18. Earthquakes in the bigger region
Based on approximations the maximum horizontal seismic soil
velocity caused by these activities was 0.0327 m/s2 assuming
loose surface deposits.

Fig. 19. Depth of the water over the reservoir X.

Water level and quantity on the Reservoir X.
According to the licenses all of the leaking water must be
pumped back to the area of reservoir X. It was required that on
the area of reservoir X must be min. 0.5 m water over the red
mud.
Red mud has been transported to the reservoir via pipe system
from the factory site. The red mud has been blown circularly
to the inner slopes of the reservoir for slushing the surface.
Ideally the water depth increases from the edges to the centre
inside the reservoir. In the middle of the reservoir the water
depth was more than 8 meter, but by the dam crest only 0.5 m
(see Figure 19.)! We made a few 3D calculations, to determine
the total stored water quantity. Considering the regualtions it
must be stored min. 850.000 m3 of water in the reservoir X.
From the site measurements the angle of friction of the wet red
mud were 1,5-2,5°, which correlated well with the triaxial test
results.
Leachate alkalinity
The caustic, highly alkaline red mud is the by-product of
hydrate production. Figure 20. shows the annual distribution
of alkaline concentration based on available information.
There is a close to linear increase starting from 2000, which
reached 4g/l Na2Oö in 2002. It is equivalent with pH value 13,
and the increase continued.
It is important to note that diaphragm walls were erected in
order to seal the area of the reservoirs. The walls were
finished in 2000 and, as the diagram shows, the alkaline
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Fig. 20. pH increase from the year 2000.
Mineralogical analysis of clay
Mineralogical analyses were also performed on the clay
subsoil after the catastrophe. The question was if the highly
alkaline leachate affected the properties of the clay layers
underneath the dam. On the upper zone of the clay layers,
tests showed a considerable amount of salt soluble in water.
Most of these salts were sodium salts due to constant effect of
caustic soda. Increasing sodium hydroxide concentration
makes cation exchange more active. When calcium exchanges
to sodium, the ratio of adsorbed sodium-cation increases,
which leads to reduction in the mechanical properties of clay,
specifically of its cohesion. X-ray diffraction and
derivatograph tests drew our attention to the fact, that the main
mineral of the critical high plasticity clay layer is sodium-
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montmorillonite, probably caused by the leachate.
As is commonly known, clays containing sodium have low
shear strength and high compressibility. In other words, after
the facility began to operate, the clay layer’s strength
underneath the dam has got constantly reduced by sodium
salts.
STABILITY ANALYSIS, 3D FEM MODEL
The goal of this investigation was to complete stability
analysis using the original data and the new data gained after
the accident. We controlled the designer’s original analysis
with finite element method (Plaxis 2D) and with classical
methods as well. Four sections’ stability has been checked by
the designer, two of them from the northern wall (I-I, III-III),
one from the western (IX-IX) and one from the southern (VIVI) wall. In case the dam wall is considered impermeable – as
the designer assumed - the safety factor is at least 1.5, which is
required by Hungarian regulations regarding stability. But
since the dam wall is inhomogeneous and permeable, the
safety factor reduces dramatically (see Figure 21.), which was
confirmed by both FEM and classical analyses.

Fig. 22. 3D FEM Analysis
The comparison of the failure mode from our calculation and
the actual pictures taken after the catastrophe confirms our
calculation method (see Fig. 23).

Fig.23. The cracked dam corner
CONCLUSION

Fig. 21. Safety factors
This could bring forth the question: why was the dam stable
for many years? A logical explanation is that the corner of the
dam was acting like a rigid spatial structure able to bear high
specific tension, unlike soils. We run the 3D calculation both
with the original and the new data. Assuming the reservoir is
filled up until level 215.88 mBf, the result with the original
parameters was n=1.02. The maximum allowed level was
216.00 mBf. Using the new parameters, according to our
calculations the dam corner cannot resist the load from the
215.88 level fill, and collapses (see Figure 22.).
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In order to provide profound answers for the causes of the
October 4, 2010 dam rapture of red mud reservoir X, it is
imperative to specify all factors by topic and process that
contributed to the accident. These factors, in chronological
order, were the followings:
• Original siting of facility
• Design of facility
• Licensing
• Construction
• Commissioning
• Operation
• Periodic review of license (monitoring, license renewal
by responsible authorities/regulators)
• External causes (e.g. natural events, previously
unknown factors)
Siting
One of the primer investments in Hungarian industry during
the late 1970s has been the Ajka Alumina Factory and the
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extension of its operational capacities. It was one of the major
sources of hard currency generation for the Socialist
Economic Machinery. In light of this it is easy to imagine
how the highest levels of political and economic decisionmaking and their mechanisms pressed these investments.
During capacity extension the correct risk assessment, in
relation to building reservoir X, the characterisation of these
risks by the size of potential effects and the probability of
failures have not been professionally performed. Specific
attention should have been given to the so-called external risk
factors, such as the various environmental effects to the
structure(s), as well as due considerations to population
exposures to potential pollution and/or catastrophic events. To
our knowledge there is no written information that has
systematically assessed this vital subject of any large-scale
developmental program.
On the other hand there were prevention plans prepared for
catastrophic flood event at the two closest municipalities to the
factory, Devecser and Kolontár, assuming the risk arising
from reservoir X. In the Northern section of Kolontár, which
has been hardest hit during the actual catastrophe, there was an
evacuation plan. Nevertheless, during the decades, several
homes were allowed to get built on the very area known to
have exposed to flood in a catastrophic event.
The fact that reservoir X was built on a site already 10 meters
above Kolontár situated only 1 kilometre away and the
enormous quantity of red mud is going to be raised by over
another 20 meters was known. Therefore is was clear that in
case of an accident that material had to flow towards the low
area, thus risk to human life was considerable.
Further it is important to note that reservoir X has been
designed to an area with varied geological and soil mechanical
conditions, where groundwater is at around ground level,
Torna creek had to be diverted from its original path, and there
was a marshy area just where the critical Northern wall of the
reservoir has got built.
The only reasonable standpoint on which this siting could be
based on was that it was a logical continuation next to the
already existing reservoir(s) toward the West side. Without a
doubt, the decision for this siting was strongly motivated by
micro-economic and financial considerations.
It can be reasonably stated that risks to human population has
been gravely underestimated during siting of this large project.
The decision-making process, driven purely by perceived
economic benefit, has been settled till the late 1980s and got
never questioned since; until the catastrophe has happened.
Design
Assessment from the point of view of standards Construction
design documentation satisfies respective geotechnical
investigation standards as to the frequency of measurement
points; however, their required depth has not been met.
Moreover, verification testing has not been correctly
performed. The design documents submitted to the authorities
for commissioning the new facility lacked structural stability
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assessment and its verification prescribed by the valid
standards of the 1980s (let alone today’s standards).
Assessment by content Based on review of various design
documents a number of contradictions have been found. One
of the mistakes found was that stability assessments have been
performed for an area 32-48 m East of actual construction of
the reservoir. Actual altitude of the critical Northwest wall
section is also off by the order of magnitude of a meter
compared to the design documents.
As prescribed in the design document the analyses of power
plant ashes for their suitability as construction materials have
been conducted only in laboratory conditions, and there was
no in situ verification of expected performance, regardless of
the fact that the walls were built from inhomogeneous
materials.
Foundation design was clearly insufficient. In fact no
foundation has been designed and built, except the removal of
topsoil to 0.30 m (for a structure tens of meters high!) and its
refill and compression after the extraction of humus.
Therefore, as due assessment of geometries and subsoil
conditions have been performed, it became clear that reservoir
X has not satisfied the standard for structural endurance and
safety (1.50), or even for basic stability (1.00) at designed
maximum reservoir load.
Moreover, after planned
recultivation, the load level would have reached an extra 1
meter – accounting for extra about 100 kN/m further load on
the instable structure.
As the designer has not recognised the inherent risk of his
work the reservoir has had only minor safety reserves (1.02 1.08, thus 2 - 8 %) for its structural integrity. Even this slight
reserve was not designed deliberately but was the result of
naturally occurring spatial framing effect of the built structure.
Licensing
Authorities commissioned the reservoir X without seeing the
necessary fully-fledged stability and safety assessments
prescribed by geotechnical standard.
Construction
Besides or rather arising from the deficiencies in the design,
construction technology has not been controlled correctly. It
can be stated that the foundation of the dam has been
performed unprofessionally.
Foundation depth should have been adjusted to the
heterogeneous soil properties indicated by geotechnical
investigations. Beside the upper humus layer, all poor shear
strength materials should have been removed, and water
permeable layers should have been sealed, all seepages
blocked.
Commissioning
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In this phase regulators have known not only the design
documentation but the realisation records during construction.
Regulators could have intervened at several times and
provided additional guidelines and orders for strengthening
built in and operational safety, for instance via advanced
monitoring systems. Nevertheless, we could recover no sign
of such construction time or ex-post intervention. Meanwhile
the factory has maintained its production and received its
temporary licences till final commissioning of reservoir X.

uneaven settlement in the dam wall, but to the original
construction level anomaly compared to other sections of the
walls. As the red mud and water level increased, this
adjustment became necessary for utlizing maximum allowed
and licenced reservoir storage capacity.
If the reservoir has the required overall structural safety level,
this levelling can have no negative influence on its integrity.
In case the red mud reservoir was at or below its designed
safety level (equillibrium limit), it could still not fail due to
this additional levelling, as them hightened dam structure has
tood strong months after this corrective measure.

Operation
Based on the information we have got access to we can state
that the operation of reservoir X has met the prescribed and
licensed/commissioned operating parameters and pertaining
standard(s).
There was no designer prescription or regulatory obligation
found for the maximum allowed water level for reservoir X.
The stored quantity of water, according to our calculations
based on actual measurements (according to workbook logs),
was 853.000 m3. Its height reached 215.88 mBf, 0.12 m
below the allowed maximum level.
This water volume at the time of accident corresponded to
technologies to be followed according to design parameters
and regulatory obligation.
Maintenance of leachate trench According to available
information the maintenance of leachate trench has been
correctly managed. Its smooth operation was proven by the
continuous working of the pumps. While preceeding the
catasrophe the two pump pairs operated over their normal
operating conditions, however, this has happened before
without any problem, thus were considered an acceptable
state. Therefore this increased pump activity cannot be
considered as an uneqvivocal precursor of the catastrophe.
Operation of the red mud intake pipe network Red mud was
transported in liquid state through the pipes. Congestion
phenomena is out of question under the temperature
conditions of Hungary’s climatic zone (between -20 C° and
+40 C°. There was no congestion recorded in the past 10
years.
Two or three times a year, from technological reasons, the
factory has stopped its production. In these occasions the
materials inside the pipe system have been high pressure air
blowed towards the reservoir. As the factory has been in
normal production during the catastrophy, it is even
theoretically impossible that any congestion occured in the
system.
The role of dam crest level adjustments in July 2010, as part of
the reservoir X’s normal operation This dam crown level
increase was in line with the orginal design and regulatory
licence, therefore it cannot be thought of as te application of
extra weight to the structure.
This levelling has started 50-100 m away from the
northwestern corner on the norht wall. It was not due to
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Periodic license reviews
There has been no new regulatory requirement, order, or
changing respective standard till the fault occurred at reservoir
X, so the operator has not had to overview the original plans
for its activities.
Monitoring We are not aware of any geotechnical monitoring
plan that would have addressed deformations in the body of
the dam system, prescribed by any designer, expert consultant,
or regulatory body up till October 4, 2010.
According to the documents we got access to, the competent
water authority has not thought such a monitoring system
would be necessary to maintain technical safety, or at least has
not requested it from the factory.
It was likely due to policy deficiency that the designer in the
1990s has not included monitoring systems in his design and
that regulator(s) have not requested it later for safe operating
conditions.
Regarding the necessity of monitoring it is important to
mention that making a decision on whether geotechnical
monitoring is needed or not, and if needed, what type of
method(s) and system(s) to use, requires geotechnical
expertise. In order to make an educated decision the dam’s
physical properties have to be understood and thus what kind
of failure(s) may be faced (e.g., rigid or creeping).
This
requires competence and substantiation from the designer,
involved experts, regulators, as well as from standardization.
Creating the necessary framework conditions is not the
responsibility of the plant operators. As the regulatory and
legal framework for monitoring has been deficient, neither the
designer nor the regulator have enforced further preventive
measures to the operation of the reservoir, most likely because
nobody presumed the facility having not sufficient safety
level. It is rather unfortunate that only after the accident –
along tedious and profound geotechnical investigations – was
realized that this sufficient level of safety was not present.
The results of our investigations have pointed to the
recognition that the dam’s material exerts rigid failure
behaviour, and thus the hazard signalling potential of a
monitoring system is rather low. The changes to sense would
be so sudden that there would be no realistic chance to
effectively intervene before rapture occurs.
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Renewal of licenses According to available information the
factory has been operating with valid licenses, with the
necessary periodic (annual) license renewals. Therefore
regulators had the opportunity to review the safety of these
operations and request, in light of reported data and assessed
processes and tendencies, further investigations, testing, and
the introduction of safety improvements from the operator.
Potential external causes
Effect of slurry wall to increasing alkali concentration and
ensuing changes in the consistency of clay base Slurry walls
have been completed in 2000 due to environmental
considerations (on the order of the regulator). Since this a
linear function in alkalinity growth can be traced in the
concentrations of heap and leachate waters. In 2004 the
concentration reached pH 13. This has interfered – through
cation exchange – with the shear strength, important from the
point of view of structural integrity, of the surfacing clay base
containing Na-montmorillonite below the Northwest corner of
reservoir X. And thus a soapy slide has been formed just
below the Northwest corner of the reservoir dam.
While the slurry wall frame has been prescribed by the
environmental regulator, in order to avoid groundwater and
then soil pollution of surrounding agricultural land, to our
knowledge, nobody has researched the potential effect of such
a structure on the structural integrity of the dam. It seems –
from retrospect - that with this decision a non-deliberate trade
off happened between environmental and geotechnical safety
criteria. It can be stated that the slurry walls acted as catalyser
of the cation exchange and degradation of soil physical
conditions.
It is also a fact that this reservoir has been designed to store
alkali.
Role of seismicity There was no seismic event recorded on the
day of accident at the Ajka area.
However, it is a fact that during the year before the dam
failure there have been 17 small events recorded of 0.7-2.7
magnitude (ML) in a 100 km diameter circle, of which 5 have
been 1.7-2.7 ML in the few months preceding the accident. In
contrast, there have been only 22 such events recorded in a 50
km diameter circle around the factory during the preceding 10
years.
This dam was built of inhomogeneous materials, framed in
several sequences, with minimum safety reserves, behaving as
a rigid spatial structure that has been subjected to 5
considerable quakes in 5 months. Due to this, at its weak
points, e.g. at its sequential construction joints, cracks (not
necessarily detectible externally by eye) might have generated
and or existing cracks might have become more significant.
While these relatively small earthquakes cannot be made
responsible directly for the dam failure, it is logical to suspect
that they have contributed to the break of this rigid,
inhomogeneous structure.
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Role of precipitation According to calibrated measurements,
during the catastrophe preceding 6 months, from 838 mm
(according to the National Meteorological Service, 5 km away
from the site) to 908 mm (according to the factory’s own
meteorological system) precipitation occurred on the site of
214 acres framed by slurry walls built on the request of the
environmental regulator, of which 174 acres are the total size
of red mud reservoirs. The average precipitation of the
preceding 44 years has been 714 mm. This precipitation level
fallen during the 6 months pre-accident equals to an expected
(and thus designed) incidence frequency of 3000 years!
This extraordinary quantity of water, naturally, has been
influencing the water balance and hydraulics of the area,
including raising groundwater, reservoir stored water and
leachate levels. It has significantly changed the hydraulics
inside the slurry wall frame.
It is a fact that even this unusual precipitation has not in itself
caused problem for reservoir operation, as the allowed
maximum storing capacity has never been exceeded. On the
other hand it is also a fact that groundwater was very close to
ground level at the critical north-western corner of reservoir
X. This is important as this heightened groundwater level has
further saturated the clay base surface already weakened by
cat-ion exchanges due to high alkalinity of red mud, on a
sloping surface.
Role of wind Assessing wind data during the day of dam
failure (October 4, 2010) from 00:00 to 13:00 wind blew from
Southeast to Northwest direction towards the breakage. This
isn’t the prevailing wind direction of this area but in the exact
opposing direction, which has turned so in the accident
preceding days.
Wind pressure has continuously increased and wind gusts
reached their peaks of 13,4 m/s (48,24 km/h) at around 12:00,
just when the dam failure occurred.
It is clear that wind pressure influences negatively structural
safety. While we talk about a relatively small factor here, it
has clearly been one of the converging risk factors in the
event.
In fact, this wind gust was the only factor in complete
synchrony with the occurrence of the dam rapture. While in
itself may be a small factor, it has likely caused a butterfly
effect in the already seriously challenged structure
CLOSING
Thus the failure of this reservoir structure was due to the
converging factors of poor siting, design, construction, as well
as regulatory deficiencies, and unfavourable environmental
conditions.
“The stability of reservoir X was provided by nature, and
taken away by nature.”
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